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LOOKING TOWARDS A HIGHER LAW
Mark E. Chopko*
Among the many contributions Father Charles Whelan has made in his
distinguished career, one cannot be underestimated. For decades he served,
officially and unofficially, as a consultant--"of counsel"--to the Office of
the General Counsel of the Catholic Bishops' Conference. In the halfcentury since he began his work in this capacity, he has watched the law
and the Church change in many different ways. But even in his roles as a
lawyer and a subject matter expert in the legal issues confronted by the
Church, he has also always been very clearly a priest of the Church. His
work has been his ministry, and his ministry has plainly pointed all who
enjoyed the benefit of his work towards a higher law-the one written in
our hearts and minds by the Hand of God.
A little more than twenty years ago, Father Whelan served the
Conference on the search committee looking for a new General Counselthe position I assumed in January 1987. Around a table of lawyers, the
questions ranged from the substance and the procedure of the law to the
politics of the Church. When it was his turn to speak, Father Whelan said
simply he was going to ask "the priest questions." Although I was familiar
with and impressed by his scholarship, I was energized by the conversation
we had about faith and what it means to put faith into action. I was
immediately impressed that he was a priest first, who happened also to
teach and practice law. This integration of lawyer and priest has allowed
him to say and do things most of us can only imagine.
I write these brief lines in gratitude for what Father Whelan has been to
and done for the Church's legal work, and to share some reflections on his
life's work as it has advanced the collective work of his many colleagues
who represent Church agencies in the United States. His last time on the
dais of the annual meeting of diocesan attorneys was in 1990.
Unfortunately his health did not allow him to accept subsequent invitations.
But on that occasion he spoke about what he had seen in Church-State
work, what he saw in 1990, and what he hoped to see as he looked forward.
As I reread his words, and his other talks to the diocesan attorneys and his
briefs amicus curiae filed for the Church, I am struck, not just by the depth
* Mr. Chopko is General Counsel of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in
Washington, D.C., and Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
Although these comments are not necessarily those of the Conference or any of its bishop
members, the expressions of gratitude, awe, and appreciation for Father Whelan's work are
widely shared in the Church, especially by the hundreds of men and women who serve as
diocesan attorneys.
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and intricacy of his analysis, but also by his prudence, common sense, and
good humor. Mostly, I am struck by his powerful profession of faith. It is
to those themes I turn.
I. A MAN OF SUBSTANCE
Father Whelan began his service to the Conference's legal office in 1959.
In his words, "we had a rather simple set of cases to work with." 1 The early
free exercise cases generally involved either Mormons or Jehovah's
Witnesses, or property disputes arising in other faith communities. On the
other hand, cases under the Establishment Clause involved many more2
interactions with Catholic institutions, including, for example, busing,
school release time, 3 education, 4 and tax exemption issues. 5 As he traced
the progression of cases, he remarked that what he "learned most from this
succession of [U.S.] Supreme Court decisions was that logic and history are
not enough in dealing with the Supreme Court. They are, of course, terribly
important, but insufficient."'6 What he did not trace was his own important
role as an advocate. A mark of a skilled advocate, in my view, is the ability
to anticipate the analytical needs of judges and Justices and to offer them
the kinds of arguments they will need to decide a case properly. That is
what Father Whelan contributed in some key cases.
For example, the brief signed by Father Whelan in Board of Education v.
Allen 7 was submitted for the National Catholic Educational Association, the
Lutheran Education Association, the National Union of Christian Schools,
and the National Conference of Yeshiva Principals. The case concerned the
constitutionality of a law authorizing public school districts to purchase and
loan approved secular subject textbooks to students attending nonpublic
(including religious) schools. Part of the attack on the statute concerned the
nature of the religious schools. The theme of the amicus brief was to decry
the "caricature" of religious schools as simply extensions of Sunday
complete and
Schools, rather than the reality of what they are:
comprehensive educational institutions. Religious formation is one purpose
of these schools, but another is basic secular education. While the state
may be barred from advancing religion, as argued in the brief, it was
obligated to assist secular education to make meaningful the rationale of
1. Charles Whelan, Supreme Court Doctrine and Religious Institutions, 34 Cath. Law.
1 (1991) [hereinafter Whelan, Supreme Court Doctrine].
2. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
4. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
5. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
6. Whelan, Supreme Court Doctrine,supra note 1, at 3.

7. Brief for National Catholic Educational Association, Lutheran Education
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (No. 660)
[hereinafter Allen Brief]. The brief was also signed by William Consedine (under Father
Charles Whelan's name) who was General Counsel of the Catholic Bishops' Conference,
and joined "of counsel" by Francis Gallagher, Alfred Scanlan, and Harmon Bums, each of
whom represented various diocesan or other Catholic interests. Id.
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8 which had sustained the right to exist for
nonpublic schools as educational choices for parents. "The wall of
separation is a wall between Church and State, not between the child and
the State." 9 The brief continued, "The No Establishment Clause does,
indeed, forbid all purposeful promotion of religion, but the Free Exercise
of
Clause also forbids denying individuals, because of their religion or lack
0
it, the right to participate in secular welfare and educational benefits."'
The Court, of course, in Allen was more circumspect, but the contours of
the majority opinion mirrored this analysis. The Court highlighted aspects
of the New York law, specifically those providing that the books are
furnished on loan to the pupil and that ownership remain in the state.11 The
opponents of this assistance highlighted the educational significance of
textbooks to the work of religious schools, but the Court rejected this
argument. "[T]his Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue
two goals, religious instruction and secular education."' 12 The Court noted
that a premise of Pierce's"holding was the view that the State's interest in
education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular teaching
that accompanied religious training in the schools maintained by the
Society of Sisters."' 13 As argued by Father Whelan's brief, the Court saw
this case as a "sensible corollary" of Pierce.14 Specifically, the Court noted
that "if the state must satisfy its interest in secular education through the
instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which
those schools perform their secular educational function."' 15 Father Whelan
rooted this analysis in notions of academic and personal freedom which he
called the "key gradient" between the no aid principle of the Establishment
Clause and the no discrimination principle of the Free Exercise Clause.
proposition,
Unfortunately, the Court was unwilling to accept this wise
16
confusion.
doctrinal
of
decades
several
for
stage
the
setting
The amicus brief, however, was prescient for its time. It argued that any
"religious effect" in the schools would occur solely as a result of private
choices made by parents as taxpayers and citizens. 17 The Court would
come to embrace this notion of private choice more clearly fifteen years

8. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
9. Allen Brief, supra note 7, at 3.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44.
12. Id. at 245.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 247.
15. Id. Pierce had made clear the ability of the state to reasonably regulate the secular
education curriculum of the schools and the qualifications of teachers, among other things.
See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
16. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for example, moved away from this
principle, trying to distinguish Allen.
17. Allen Brief, supra note 7, at 15-16. Specifically, the brief illustrated this point with
an example of a donation to a religious charity by a citizen from her government Social
Security check.
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later.' 8 Moreover, the brief argued that the constitutionality of the program
could not practically turn on what choices citizens make under general
educational benefits programs, but rather should be measured by the
"secular character of the State's program."' 19 The Court did not truly
recognize this principle until many years later. The practical problems of
trying to monitor individual citizen choices year by year are daunting.
Rather than have the constitutionality turn on shifting facts, the Court
20
wisely adopted program design as the touchstone for constitutionality.
Two years later in an amicus brief filed in the name of the Catholic
Bishops Conference, Father Whelan confronted the constitutionality of the
inclusion of religious entities in a program of general real estate tax
exemption. 2 1 Responding to the charge that New York City's program was
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, the amicus brief noted the
limits of the then prevailing "purpose and effect" test cobbled together in
the 1962 school prayer cases. 2 2 The brief urged a different analysis and
rooted its conclusion that the program was constitutional in the longstanding history of the practice of tax exemption for religious institutions
under the state's welfare powers. 2 3 It also noted that the Supreme Court
had never decided that an exemption of a religious body was
unconstitutional. 24 The brief suggested that it would be far more intrusive
were the government to try to sever the religious from the secular than to
apportion tax liability within religious institutions. Such a public procedure
would require invasive scrutiny (the brief did not use the word
"entanglement"). 25 In a worse case, the brief noted that depriving religious
institutions of tax exemption would require those institutions to channel
resources away from public charity. Services to the poor would suffer.

18. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Witters
provides an example of a government employee who donates most or all of his salary to
religion as a "private choice[]" of funds whose source was the government. Id. at 486-87.
19. Allen Brief, supra note 7, at 16.
20. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399, 401-02 (1983) (noting that courts "loath" to
adopt a rule making the constitutionality of a neutral benefits law turn on its use by different
classes of citizens).
This rationale is the cornerstone of the U.S. Supreme Court's
affirmation of vouchers. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650-51 (2002). The
principle of design over implementation makes enormous sense unless courts are expected to
engage in all sorts of after-the-fact determinations. Mark E. Chopko, Vouchers Can Be
Constitutional,31 Conn. L. Rev. 945, 957-58 (1999).
21. See generally Brief of United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant, Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (No. 135)
[hereinafter Walz Brief].
22. Id. at 63, 70-74; see also Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ("[T]here

must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."). Although the Walz Brief argues that the case for exemption can satisfy the test, it
questions the need to apply this single test when relevant precedent was not so limited.
23. Walz Brief, supra note 21, at 27. The text was captioned "America's Undeviating
Historical Policy and Practice of Exempting Religious Property from Taxation." Id.
24. Id. at 54.
25. Id. at 83-85.
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Likewise churches that were less well-off would also suffer much more
26
than wealthier churches.
In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 27 the Court upheld the validity
of the grant of an exemption to church property. In doing so, the Court
recognized the analytical problems created by the "purpose and effect" test
and wrote a new variation-the requirement to avoid "excessive
entanglement. '28 In applying this test, the Court recognized the history and
pervasive nature of property tax exemptions for religious bodies as part of
the state's general program to promote religious, educational, and charitable
works in the community. 29 Equally important, the Court recognized that
"[e]limination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of
government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the
train of those legal processes. '30 In other words, more entanglement would
result.
Not all of Father Whelan's wisdom was accepted by the Court. In briefs
for the cases that became Lemon v. Kurtzman, 3 1 he unsuccessfully tried to
extend the rationale of his Allen child benefit and academic freedom
argument. In Father Whelan's view, promoting the educational choices of
parents and children increased the number of educational providers and
strengthened the nation's commitment to a well-formed citizenry. He also
attempted to limit the use of excessive entanglement analysis. 32 The Court
did not agree, holding Pennsylvania's and Rhode Island's programs of
subsidy for teacher salaries and other assistance to religious schools to be
'3 3
unconstitutional, on grounds of "excessive entanglement.
These are two of the many contributions that Father Whelan made to the
development of constitutional law as the Supreme Court described the
boundaries and working relationships between church and state. But his
contributions to the development of the law also extended to the areas of
taxation and tax exemption of churches, especially his creative work on the

26. Id. at 91-94.
27. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
28. Id. at 670.
29. Id. at 676-77.
30. Id. at 674.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. Brief for the National Catholic Educational Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (No. 89) [hereinafter Lemon Brief] (stating "a
school is a school, not a church"); see also id. at 30 (arguing that Walz did not abandon the
purpose-and-effect test). The same parties for whom he appeared in Allen authorized the
amicus brief filed in Lemon and its companion case Earley v. DiCenso,401 U.S. 931 (1971).
The Brief of National Catholic Educational Association et al. in Earley was also signed by
Dean Jesse H. Choper of the University of California Law School at Berkeley. Brief of
National Catholic Educational Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants,
Earley, 401 U.S. 931 (No. 569).
33. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
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"vow of poverty" and his seminal article on the definition of "Church" in
34
the Internal Revenue Code.
Thirty years ago, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue
Ruling 77-290, which defines when compensation received by a member of
a religious order will be treated as individual income and when it will be
treated as income of his or her order (and thus not be taxable because the
religious order is a tax-exempt organization). 35 In the early 1980s,
organizations representing religious orders, including the General Counsel's
Office at the Bishops' Conference and Father Whelan, worked to clarify the
meaning of the 1977 ruling, specifically by attempting to expand its scope
to include compensation received by a member of a religious order working
for a non-Church charitable organization, such as a state university, the Red
Cross, a county hospital, etc. 36 Father Whelan's contributions added
substance to the legal discussion and an understanding of the works of
charity which surpassed that of others in the conversation. 37 They were
essential to the effort, even if it was ultimately unsuccessful.
Father Whelan's comprehensive article entitled, "Church" in the Internal
Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems,38 was published in the
Fordham Law Review thirty years ago, at a time when there were no law
school courses in exempt organizations, let alone on the Byzantine
exemptions in the Internal Revenue Code relating to church and religious
tax-exempt organizations. He proffered a definition that would allow the
government to distinguish between exempt and nonexempt religious
activity, so as to render the myriad of religious charitable activities within
the protection of the Constitution. 39 His article broke new ground and
paved the way for those who have followed in his footsteps for these last
thirty years, including members of the Conference's legal team. What is
most remarkable is that many of the definitional problems, and the issues
flowing from them, which Father Whelan identified in 1977 continue to
plague the religious community today. 40 This is a theme to which I will
return later.

34. See Charles M. Whelan, "Church " in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional

Problems,45 Fordham L. Rev. 885 (1977).
35. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26.
36. See Charles M. Whelan, Critical Developments in the Vow of Poverty Area and

Update on Unrelated Business, 25 Cath. Law. 340 (1980) [hereinafter Whelan, Critical
Developments]; Charles M. Whelan, S.J., Vow of Poverty Rulings and Update on Unrelated
Business, 23 Cath. Law. 201 (1977) [hereinafter Whelan, Vow ofPoverty].
37. See generally Whelan, Critical Developments, supra note 36; Whelan, Vow of
Poverty, supra note 36.

38. Whelan, supra note 34.
39. Father Whelan added to this literature in a 1979 article published by the Annals of
the American Academy of Political & Social Science called The Uneasy Boundary: Church
and State.

40. This is one of the points of contention between religious institutions and the
government today. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal.
2004) (rejecting a classification argument that placed a Catholic charities agency outside the
scope of a "religious employer" exemption).
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Finally, Father Whelan had a remarkable ability to look beyond the
horizon. He accurately predicted a series of trends in the adjudication of the
Church's properties a full quarter century before they were manifested. In
1980, he predicted a shift in church-related litigation toward cases designed
to test the limits of the Church's rights and exemptions in property, liability,
and accountability. He read the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v.
Wolf' as inviting lawyers to write Church documents dealing with property
clearly as to questions of ownership and connectedness to the faith
community. 42 He could not have foreseen--or could he?-the need for
such clarity that would arise as the Church unexpectedly confronted the
bankruptcies of dioceses in recent years. 43 Likewise, Father Whelan
44
remarked on the trends of litigants seeking deeper pockets for liabilities
45
and governments seeking more penetrating accountability.
Gazing ahead,
he offered suggestions on how to separate legitimate governmental inquiries
from the entangling ones.4 6 His concerns and suggestions, valuable then,
are a source of enduring insight into the behavior of courts when they
encounter religious institutions.

41. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
42. See Charles M. Whelan, S.J., Current Attitudes of the Courts Towards Church
Properties and Liabilities, 26 Cath. Law. 219 (1981) [hereinafter Whelan, Current
Attitudes].
43. In 1980, Father Whelan used the bankruptcy of a Jesuit school in Houston to
illustrate his point about ownership. The bankruptcy trustee sued the directors of the school
and the regional Jesuit Province for mismanagement. One issue was whether the Province
even had the authority to represent the Society of Jesus. Id. at 224. Twenty-five years later,
in the cases of diocesan bankruptcies, the courts highlighted the opportunity that lawyers had
to clarify the structural relationships between a diocese. and its parishes. E.g., Tort Claimants
Comm. v. Roman Catholic, 335 B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005). The court also noted that
the canon law did not preclude some other arrangement, such as a separate corporation or
express trust that could be documented in accord with the civil law. Id. at 861-62. The court
cited the Archdiocese of Portland's own canonical experts against it, noting that canon law
experts have long stressed the importance of conforming the civil structures to the canon
law. Id. at 865-66; see also id. at 857 & n.15.
44. Specifically he used the then recent decision of a California court which applied
internal church documents to hold that the United Methodist Church was a single
unincorporated association for liability purposes. Barr v. United Methodist Church, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Whelan, Current Attitudes, supra note 42, at 223-24.
Virtually all commentators regard the case as an unconstitutional excess.
45. At the time of his speech, the California Attorney General had appointed a receiver
for the Worldwide Church of God, which was organized as a California corporation, to
respond to allegations of fraud in the church. Father Whelan accurately described the case as
a "real nightmare." Whelan, CurrentAttitudes, supra note 42, at 225. The outcry against the
actions of the Attorney General resulted in amendments to the California Corporation Code
narrowing his oversight of religious entities and an opinion of a California court suggesting
the receiver was unconstitutional. People ex rel Deukmejian v. Worldwide Church of God,
178 Cal. Rptr. 913, 915 (Ct. App. 1981) ("How the State, whether acting through the
Attorney General or the courts, can control church property and the receipt and expenditure
of church funds without necessarily becoming involved in the ecclesiastical functions of the
church is difficult to conceive.").
46. Whelan, CurrentAttitudes, supra note 42, at 226-27.
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II. A MAN OF PRUDENCE, COMMON SENSE, AND GOOD HUMOR

In a 1969 talk to the diocesan attorneys of the United States, Father
Whelan explained the precarious nature of the victory in Allen. 4 7 The
majority opinion in Allen was based on the record which showed that not all
teaching at the schools was religious, not every subject for activity in the
school was intertwined with religion and that secular textbooks were not
used to teach religion. 48 From the decided cases, he lifted a set of
principles: Religious schools have a right to exist; they have a right to be
different than public schools; and the state may assist secular education in
those schools. But he also offered a predictive principle: It should be
enough, he argued, for the validity of a program to be tested by its secular
purpose and secular effect. If there is a secularity of means and public
control over public funds, that should be sufficient. 49 The state does not
have to invade the religious schools in order to be sure that those funds are
50
properly spent.
"We have to be much more than right in our arguments. We have to be
persuasive .... ,,51
His remarks were not based merely on what he thought
right or just, but rather on what he thought would be persuasive to the
Justices then sitting on the United States Supreme Court. 52 In a line of
cases from 1971 to 1985, the Supreme Court was unreceptive to these
arguments. 53 How much worse would this situation have been if one had
given in to the temptation to demand complete and unlimited funding for
religious schools in response to the then-prevailing doctrinal trends?
Knowing when, how, and how much to argue marks Father Whelan as a
54
skilled and prudent advocate.

47. Charles M. Whelan, Religious Permeation of Secular Subjects-Educationaland
ConstitutionalConsiderations,in Proceedings: National Meeting of Diocesan Attorneys 79
(1969).
48. Id. at 80; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
49. Religious Permeation,supranote 47, at 81.
50. Id. It is possible to read Lemon to agree with that premise-and more. It eschewed
the legitimacy of any invasion of religious schools by the state. There, the Court found that
the surveillance required to be sure that no state aid was spent to advance religion would be
excessively entangling.
51. Id. at 79.
52. Id. ("I have made a very strong effort to be attentive to what I think to be the
framework of the intellectual discourse of the nine men currently on the Supreme Court of
the United States. I would insist on the absolute necessity of this attention to the way they
think and to the arguments that may be persuasive to them.").
53. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
54. Father Whelan may have been the only priest to have argued a case before the
United States Supreme Court. In late 1971, he squared off against Leo Pfeffer, from
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State and the American Civil Liberties
Union, in a case involving the legitimacy of the exemption of a parking lot owned by a
Baptist Church. On weekends the parking lot supplied the space needed for worshippers;
during the week it made money for the Church. The Church had prevailed in the Florida
Supreme Court and in the three-judge district court. No one will know how this case might
have come out on the merits, because after the district court opinion, the Florida legislature
amended the statute under which exemption was granted to narrow the exemption to
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Several years later, he echoed this argument in the midst of a legislative
battle over the tax on unrelated business income. "We should never
challenge the authority of Congress to tax commercial activities, whether
those activities are religiously motivated or not. The temptation to take
extreme positions should be resisted. '55 As authority for this argument, he
cited Scripture. He noted one should render unto Caesar what is Caesar's,
56
to God what is God's, and not to confuse the two.
Father Whelan cited a particular example of doctrinal confusion ten years
after the 1968 victory in Allen, won "by emphasizing substantial public and
secular functions of our schools."'57 In 1979, he said, "we find ourselves
now insisting that the schools are too religious to be required to file annual
financial reports or to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board."' 58 Although he noted "no necessary contradiction in this
change of emphasis," he pointedly admitted that the church was "indeed in
dangerous waters and that we must chart our course with extreme care."' 59
His solution was to go back to basics:
to reexamine the criteria that Church lawyers should use in accepting or
opposing governmental regulations of Church affairs. Only by such
reexamination can we hope to avoid foundering on the fallacies of the
moment. Surely we ought to think twice before
picking up weapons...
60
that the Supreme Court has used to clobber us.
Given the difficulties that the Church continues to confront in its daily
encounters with the regulatory state, Father Whelan's words continue to
offer a stirring and practical challenge. His reexamination of basic
principles led him to three types of arguments. First, he outlined a Church
objection which he said should be the rarest of all objections. It was not
written in the civil law but rather in the precepts of Scripture. He quoted
Acts 5:29, "Obedience to God comes before obedience to men." He
continued, "The Church can never accept laws that make it impossible for
the Church to preach the Gospel or administer the sacraments," and the
Church must be willing to accept "legal punishment" that might follow
disobedience to such laws. 6 1 Although regulatory laws that promote
legitimate governmental interests might
indirectly render the Church's work more complicated or more expensive
• .. the only law to which the Church objects precisely as the Church is a
law that denies the Church the basic right to preach the Gospel and
property used "predominantly" for religious purposes, mooting out the appeal. Diffenderfer
v. Cent. Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972).
55. Charles M. Whelan, Churches and the Tax on UnrelatedBusiness Income, 20 Cath.
Law. 357 (1974).
56. Id.; see also Matthew 22:20-:22; Mark 12:17.
57. Charles M. Whelan, Origin & Impact of Government Regulations, 24 Cath. Law.

228, 228 (1979) [hereinafter Whelan, Government Regulations].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id,
61. Id. at 229.
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administer the sacraments. The Church proclaims
that its members are
62
citizens of two worlds, bound by the laws of both.
And then in words that must have elicited a gasp from his audience, Father
63
Whelan wryly noted, "Christ came to save us, not to exempt us."
In his second and third arguments, Father Whelan moved to consider
constitutional and public policy objections. In making these arguments,
however, he counseled against arguments which he considered to be based
on shallow doctrine. Rather, he urged Church lawyers to be "reasonably
sure that the principles [on which we base our arguments] will serve us well
over the long run." 64 "I sometimes suspect that we would make more
progress if we relied less on the Constitution and more on common sense
and widely held conceptions of the general welfare." 65 In these arguments,
he counseled advocates for the Church not to rely exclusively on the courts,
66
but to continue to press their cases in the legislatures and with executives.
In making his cases, Father Whelan did not neglect the court of public
opinion. Writing on the pages of America magazine, he often engaged, in
clear and common sense terms, the broader questions of Church navigating
a complicated society: "Watch what you wish for!" One could hear him
thinking these words as he wrote about the 1990 Supreme Court opinion
immunizing flag burning under the First Amendment as an act of public
protest. 67 While noting that the First Amendment "protects the most
virulent forms of spoken or printed" offensive messages, he cautioned that
"[e]xtending the doctrine to nonverbal actions, however, is quite another
matter. '68 Conduct is always subject to greater regulation than mere
speech. Or in Father Whelan's words, "Your lips, not your teeth, are
protected." 69 He warned that if flags and other symbols of the body politic
could be trashed in the name of public protest, could places of worship be
70
far behind?
And, approaching the most current set of confrontations between
religious institutions in the government, the accountability for misconduct
and clergy abuse of minors, Father Whelan brought the bright beam of
common sense to this difficult topic. 7 1 He warned that the scandal of clergy
abuse and the actions of some religious leaders should not be an excuse to
trample the legitimate and constitutionally expected separation between
government and religion. "It would be just as wrong for the churches to
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 230.
65. Id. at 231.
66. Id.
67. Charles M. Whelan, Not Flagburners But the Court, America, July 7, 1990, at 4
(discussing United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. In the 1994 Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, Congress made some
attacks on churches criminal offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2) (2000).
71. Charles M. Whelan, Church, Government and Media, America, May 27, 2002, at 21.
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expect the federal and state governments to solve the problem of sexual
abuse of children as it would be for the government to expect the religious
denominations to solve the problem. '72 Why? "The problem is not
religious. The problem is worldwide, age-old and-in the current state of
physical and mental medical knowledge-ineradicable. '73 But his focus
was on collaboration, not confrontation, in dealing with a problem that
pervades society, to embrace
the good works of all "for the health and
'74
future of the children.
In late 1987, as a novice General Counsel, I participated in a meeting of
the Religious Liberty Committee of the National Council of Churches
organized by the late Reverend Dean Kelley. Father Whelan had been an
original member of the Committee, which continues to serve as a forum for
civil conversation about hotly debated issues involving the proper
relationship between church and state, and other important topics. As a
new member, I did not know quite what to expect when I was asked to talk
about the grant of certiorari in Bowen v. Kendrick75 involving the
constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act. I thought there would
be a quiet discussion. Instead I went toe-to-toe with the legal advisor for
the Baptist Joint Committee. Back and forth we and the other Committee
members struggled, advancing arguments great and small for how the Court
should rule. As we exhausted ourselves and the topic, Reverend Kelley
asked Father Whelan, "Charles, what do you think?" And the reply--"I
think we weren't able to settle these disputes then, and we weren't able to
76
do so today."
Indeed.
III. A MAN OF THE CHURCH
As he once pondered the implications of expanded taxpayer standing to
challenge governmental actions under the Establishment Clause, 77 Father
Whelan remarked that he had read that someone had challenged the
issuance of religious-themed Christmas stamps by the Postal Service and
that the challenge would extend to the Apollo 8 stamp. The flight of Apollo
8 orbited the Moon in late December 1968. On Christmas Eve the flight
commander read from Genesis.7 8 The stamp contained the first photo of the
Earth from the Moon taken by the astronauts and the words "In the
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).

76. See also Charles M. Whelan, The Enduring Problems of Religious Liberty, America,
Nov. 30, 1985, at 368 ("[T]he problems of religious liberty rank among the most serious in
the world.") [hereinafter Whelan, Religious Liberty].
77. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Charles M. Whelan, Constitutional
Implications and Considerations: Flast v. Cohen, in Proceedings: National Meeting of
Diocesan Attorneys, supra note 47, at 19.
78. The Apollo 8 Christmas Eve Broadcast (television broadcast Dec. 24, 1968),
availableat http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/apollo8_xmas.html.
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beginning God...1,79 Father Whelan remarked to his diocesan attorney
80
colleagues in 1969, "I don't know if they are going to put three dots in it,
but if they put a question mark, I think we ought to sue."' 81 History does not
record the placement of a question, and therefore the filing of litigation by
Father Whelan was unnecessary. But no one could ever mistake that Father
82
Whelan has been a priest first, last, and always.
Using his sound approach to problems, he sought solutions consonant
with the teaching of the Church. He is practical and engaging, challenging
and reflective. He wrote much about the doctrine of "higher law" as found
in United States law.
The Declaration of Independence speaks of the laws of nature, and of
nature's God; the Constitution speaks of due process. In both documents
we find written into the American tradition the concept of an order
normative for purely positive laws, an order not dependent
for its
83
existence or justification on the will of any human legislator.
In remarking about this higher law, he challenges us still to lift up our eyes
towards the source of our hope. "As citizens of two worlds, we have a duty
to both God and Caesar to use our intelligence, our energy, and our talents
to improve the temporal and spiritual well-being of the Church and of all
84
our fellow men."
In his 1990 remarks to the diocesan attorneys, Father Whelan ended by
offering some reflections on what he hoped to see. First, he hoped that
there would be a broad endorsement of the religious heritage of the country
by the Court. 85 We still await that day. 86 His specific example was the
Thanksgiving holiday, an insight into the priest, giving thanks.
Second, he hoped for an end to religious conflict and a reopening of the
places in the world then inside the Iron Curtain closed to religious

79. The stamp itself can be seen at http://www.skyimagelab.com/apollo8stamp.html.
80. In the New American Bible, Genesis begins "In the beginning when God created the
heavens and the earth ....
Thus a stamp might have stated, "In the beginning... God."
The King James version reads, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."
Genesis 1: 1.

81. Whelan, supra note 77, at 24.
82. Father Whelan speaks movingly of his own faith journey in "The Enduring Problems
of Religious Liberty," a reflection on his friend and mentor Father John Courtney Murray.
Whelan, Religious Liberty, supra note 76, at 372.
83. Charles M. Whelan, The "HigherLaw " Doctrine in Bracton and St. Thomas, 8 Cath.

Law. 218 (1962).
84. Whelan, Government Regulations,supra note 57, at 231.
85. Whelan, Supreme Court Doctrine,supra note 1, at 14.
86. The Supreme Court in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow flirted with the
constitutionality of the reference "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, but the case was
resolved on nonconstitutional grounds. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (concluding that the respondent lacked standing to commence litigation on behalf of
his daughter). Father Whelan noted, "Government may represent the supreme religious truth
of God's existence and sovereignty. When it comes, however, to distinctively sectarian
beliefs, government must represent the truth of society as it actually is. The truth is that
American society is religiously pluralist." Whelan, Religious Liberty, supra note 76, at 371.
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celebrations. 87 We have seen no end to conflict and continued challenges to
the recognition of the human right of religious freedom as the base on
which other rights are built. But we have seen progress.
And he concluded his remarks with a prayer that we Catholic lawyers
would not forget our ethical and God-given responsibility for the
preservation of both church and state contributing in their own ways to
build up the common good. He recalled his own work and said that he
found that he was passing from "a very energetic Martha to what I hope is a
more contemplative Mary." 88 Yet his prayer-one of his many giftsremains with us as today I offer one for him. In a special way, we Catholic
lawyers owe him an enormous debt of gratitude for his counsel,
companionship, and priestly service. We promise we will remember his
elegant words that are both uplifting and humbling: "The salvation of
souls, not the exemption of churches, is the pearl of great price." Amen.

87. Whelan, Supreme Court Doctrine,supra note 1, at 15.
88. Id.
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